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The senses as psychological kinds 
Matthew Nudds 
 
The distinction we make between five different senses is a universal one.1  Rather than 
speaking of generically perceiving something, we talk of perceiving in one of five 
determinate ways: we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste things.  In distinguishing 
determinate ways of perceiving things what are we distinguishing between?  What, in 
other words, is a sense modality?2  An answer to this question must tell us what 
constitutes a sense modality and so needs to do more than simply describe differences in 
virtue of which we can distinguish the perceptions of different senses.  There are many 
such differences – the different perceptions involve different sense organs, sensitivity to 
different kinds of stimuli, the perception of different properties, and they involve 
different kinds of experiences – but which, if any, of these differences are the differences 




To say what is constitutive of a sense modality we need to say what all instances of 
perceiving something with a particular sense have in common in virtue of which they are 
instances of perceiving with that sense.3  Many philosophers suppose that there is an 
obvious answer to this question.  In order to perceive something one must have an 
experience of it.4  Seeing something requires having a visual experience of it, hearing 
                                                 
1 Or almost universal: it is possible that some cultures distinguish fewer than five senses (by 
grouping together two senses we distinguish), but I have not been able to find a description of 
any culture that distinguishes more than five senses (for the anthropology of the senses, see 
Howes 1991).  In talking of the distinction we make between senses I am talking about the 
distinction we actually make (and have made for at least 2000 years) between five senses.  There 
may be other distinctions that we could make or even ought to make; I am not talking about 
them. 
2 Throughout this chapter I use ‘sense modality’ to mean ‘sense modality as we commonly 
understand it’ and am agnostic about the nature of its referent.  In other contexts ‘sense modality’ 
may be taken to refer to something specific – in physiology to anatomically individuated sensory 
transducers, for example.  It doesn’t follow from the fact that common-sense and physiology use 
the same term that they are talking about the same kind of thing.  And it doesn’t follow from the 
fact that science distinguishes more than five senses that common sense is mistaken: that 
depends on whether common sense and science are talking about the same kind of thing. 
3 An account that failed to explain what all perceptions of a single sense have in common would 
not explain why we make a distinction between five senses. 
4 This used to be accepted as an a priori truth; some philosophers now think (wrongly in my 
view) that phenomena such as blindsight show that it’s false. 
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something requires having an auditory experience of it, and so on.  The different kinds of 
experiences involved in perceiving are what constitute perceiving with different senses.  
We see something just in case we perceive it in virtue of having a visual experience of it; 
hear something just in case we perceive it in virtue of having an auditory experience of it, 
and so on.  To answer the question in this way is to give an experiential account of the 
senses. 
Of course, such an account would be circular if the only explanation we could 
give of what makes an experience a visual experience is that it is the kind of experience 
involved in seeing things.  A defender of the experiential account must suppose, 
therefore, that we can distinguish experiences into kinds corresponding to each of the 
senses simply in virtue of their character as experiences. That is, they must suppose that 
there is some property that is intrinsic to experiences that can explain the distinction, a 
property that is independent of how experiences are produced.  Non-experiential accounts, 
by contrast, explain the distinction by appeal to the non-intrinsic properties of 
experiences.5 
Although much of what we perceive about the things around us we perceive with 
more than one sense, we experience the world as unified.  When we see and hear a car 
passing in the street we are aware of the car and its properties – its colour, how it sounds, 
where it is, how big it is, and so on; when we look at something that we hold in our hand 
we are aware of the object and its properties – its weight, shape, and colour.  In both 
cases, we are aware of properties that are in fact perceived with different senses as 
properties of single object.  Our perceptual system integrates information about the 
object that is picked up using different senses to produce a unified experience of the 
object as having those properties.  To say that we experience the world as unified is just 
to say that when we perceive properties that are properties of a single object they are 
normally experienced as such, even when they are perceived with different senses.6 
It is often remarked that perceptual experience is transparent.  When we reflect 
introspectively on our experience, the only objects and properties to which we can attend 
are those objects and properties of which we are apparently aware in having the 
experience.  As a consequence, just as the world seems unified in experience, so our 
                                                 
5 My labeling here is stipulative.  Some strongly externalist accounts of experience end up in the 
non-experiential category because they take aspects of experiences to be constituted by mind-
independent objects.  
6 Since a perceptual system that integrates information about an object picked up with different 
senses is less likely to get things wrong about that object it is evolutionarily advantageous that our 
senses do this (see Lewkowicz and Kraebel 2004, and Bertelson and de Gelder 2004). 
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experience of the world seems unified to introspection.  In shifting our attention between 
aspects of an experience that is produced by different senses, we are simply shifting 
attention between different properties of the objects of which we are apparently aware in 
having that experience.  We cannot attend to a visual or auditory experience as such, only 
to the objects and properties that we visually and auditorily perceive (or apparently 
perceive).7  If that’s right, then there is nothing of which we are aware solely on the basis 
of introspecting our experience which is sufficient to explain the distinction we make 
between different senses.8  That makes it doubtful that we can distinguish experiences 
into kinds corresponding to the senses on the basis of their character as experiences, and 
doubtful too that we can give an experiential account of the senses.  It seems more 
plausible to suppose that in distinguishing experiences into kinds we are distinguishing 
between them on the basis of how they are produced. 
Although our (unified) experience of objects and their properties is produced by 
the operation of different sensory mechanisms,9 this is not apparent to us in 
introspection.10  It is a fact that we can only discover by reflecting on what is involved in 
coming to be aware of objects and properties; that is, by reflecting on the different ways 
in which we come to perceive things.11  In virtue of the fact that perception involves 
different perceptual mechanisms, there are various different causal conditions that have 
to be satisfied in order to perceive, and these vary for different properties.  Some 
properties we perceive by, for example, looking at objects, others by touching objects, 
and so on.  We can explain why we distinguish perceptions into perceptions of different 
senses by appeal to our understanding the connection between what we can perceive and 
the satisfaction of these different causal conditions associated with different perceptual 
mechanisms.  The best explanation, therefore, of the distinction we make between 
                                                 
7 Here I am expressing a fundamental disagreement with Keeley who claims that “One of the 
perhaps most striking phenomenological facts about human perceptual experience of the world is 
that it seems to be divided into modes… The existence of separate sensory modalities would 
seem to be a brute fact about perception, if ever there was one” (2002, p.5).  He doesn’t say what 
features of experience he takes to support his claim. 
8 I am assuming that we cannot explain the distinction in terms of the objects of experience for 
the simple reason that the very same objects and properties can be perceived with more than one 
sense.  For the senses to be individuated in terms of their objects there would need to be one 
kind of object ‘proper’ to each sense.  I discuss this in Nudds 2003, sec. 3. 
9 I use the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘process’ interchangeably. 
10 For a discussion of the limits of introspection, see Martin 1997. 
11 This means that prior to having such a reflective understanding we can make no distinction 
between senses.  The developmental evidence supports this claim (Yanix and Shatz 1988; O’Neill 
et al. 1992).  For a discussion of whether chimpanzees have a reflective understanding of seeing, 
see Povinelli and Eddy 1996, and the debate between Tomasello et al, and Povinelli and Vonk in 
Hurley and Nudds 2006. 
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different kinds of experience – between visual experience and tactile experience, and so 
on – is in terms of a reflective understanding of the connection between experiences 
involved in the perception of certain kinds of objects and properties and the different 
ways we perceive those objects and properties – that is, in terms of the different ways 
those experiences were produced.   
My suggestion, then, is that the most plausible explanation of the distinction we 
make between senses is that we distinguish perceptions into perceptions of different 
senses on the basis of a reflective understanding of how those perceptions were 
produced.  In distinguishing perceptions in this way we are distinguishing between 
perceptions produced by different kinds of sensory mechanism, and so our concepts of 
the senses must be concepts of different kinds of sensory mechanism.  This provides an 
answer to the question of what constitutes a sense modality.  A sense modality just is a 
kind of sensory mechanism, and all instances of, say, seeing something are instances of 
seeing that thing in virtue of their having been produced by a single kind of sensory 
mechanism – the sensory mechanism of vision.   
It might be objected that the distinction we make between different senses is a 
universal and common-sense one; it’s a distinction made with only a vague and 
superficial understanding of the nature of our sensory mechanisms, by people who 
perhaps know little more than that seeing involves looking, touching involves contact, 
and so on.  It’s just not plausible, therefore, to think that in distinguishing different 
senses we are distinguishing between perceptions on the basis of the way that they were 
produced, nor that our concepts of the senses are concepts of these different kinds of 
sensory mechanism. 
I agree that it’s implausible to think that in making the distinction between five 
senses we deploy detailed knowledge of, or a theory of, the mechanisms of perception; 
but distinguishing between perceptions on the basis of the kind of sensory mechanism 
that produces them doesn’t require such knowledge, any more than making common-
sense distinctions between animal species requires knowledge of evolutionary theory, or 
distinguishing between different kinds of metals requires knowledge of atomic theory.  In 
all these cases we can use concepts which refer to different natural kinds without 
knowing what makes something an instance of the kind in question.  This is because it is 
possible to give an account of what determines the reference of the concept 
independently of an account of what determines the concept’s extension, and so give an 
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account of that in which possession of the concept consists that doesn’t require 
knowledge of what makes something a member of the kind.12   
In claiming that the senses are different kinds of sensory mechanism and that our 
concepts are concepts of kinds of sensory mechanism we need be committed to no more 
than that a similar explanation can be given of our concepts of different senses.  There 
are two requirements that such an explanation must satisfy.  Firstly, it must explain how 
the reference of our concepts of different senses is fixed independently of an account of 
what determines their extension; and secondly, it must show that the relevant sensory 
mechanisms exist and so determine the extension of the concepts.  If either of these 
requirements is not met, then our common-sense distinction between five senses cannot 
be a distinction between kinds of sensory mechanism.13 
Reference fixing requires an understanding of the casual dependence of 
perceptions on different ways of perceiving; that understanding may simply consist in the 
capacity to think of our perception of one kind of property as being produced differently 
to our perception of some other kind of property.  Someone who understands the 
connection between perceiving different properties of things and looking at them, 
touching them, putting them in their mouth, and so on, has such a capacity.  So, for 
example, we might think that the perception of an object is an instance of seeing it just in 
case it is produced as a result of the operation of the sensory mechanism that involves 
looking at the object; it is an instance of touching an object just in case it is produced as a 
result of the operation of the sensory mechanism that involves contacting the object with 
a part of our body, and so on.  By grasping such principles we can refer to the different 
kinds of mechanism that enable us to perceive – the mechanism that involves looking, 
the mechanism that involves contact, and so on – without having detailed knowledge of 
the operations of those mechanisms, and without knowledge of what determines the 
extension of concepts of perceptions produced by these different mechanisms.  The first 
requirement, then, can be met. 
What about the second requirement?  Here the question is, in large part, an 
empirical one: Does our perceptual system consist (in part) of five kinds of sensory 
mechanisms?  If our concepts refer to kinds of perceptual mechanisms, then the 
                                                 
12 I have in mind the kind of account suggested by Putnam (1975) and the view of kinds 
described by Millikan (2005). 
13 Failure of reference doesn’t itself show that our concepts are not natural-kind concepts, but 
does show that judgments involving those concepts are never true.  If we have reasons to think 
the judgments can be true, then we have a reason to think the concepts are not natural-kind 
concepts.  I argue below that we do have reasons to think the judgments can be true. 
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mechanisms must actually exist to be referred to by our concepts.  What does that 
require?  It requires that there exist a sensory mechanism corresponding to each of the 
ways we commonly distinguish perceptions: a mechanism which enables us to see, a 
mechanism which enables us to hear, and so on; and it requires that there is a single kind 
of mechanism that produces all (or most) of the perceptions that we commonly classify 
as being of a single sense: all (or most) of the perceptions we commonly classify as 
instances of seeing must be produced by a single kind of mechanism, all  
(or most) of those of hearing must be produced by a single kind of mechanism and so 
on.  Since we actually make a distinction between, and have concepts of, five senses it 
must be possible to identify five perceptual mechanisms for these concepts to refer to:14 
if there are five such mechanisms our concepts may refer to them; conversely, if there are 
not five such mechanisms, our concepts of the five senses cannot be concepts of kinds 
of perceptual mechanisms.  Although appealing to kinds of perceptual mechanism in 
order to explain in what the distinction between senses consists doesn’t require that we 
know a theory of the mechanisms of perception, it does require that such a theory would 
make a distinction between five kinds of perceptual mechanism.15  So the question we 
need to answer is this: does a theory of the mechanisms of perception distinguish five 
kinds of sensory mechanisms?  A theory of the mechanisms of perception must explain 
the mechanisms that enable us to perceive things; such explanations are psychological; 
therefore a theory of the mechanisms of perception is a psychological theory of 
perception.16  The question we need to answer is therefore: Does a psychological theory 
of perception distinguish five kinds of perceptual mechanism or process?  This is the 




                                                 
14 I am assuming that our common-sense distinction is correct; I discuss the possibility that it is 
mistaken – that there are not five senses as we conceive them below. 
15 Whenever I talk of perceptual mechanisms I mean mechanisms that produce perceptions of 
the kind we commonly classify as perceptions of the five senses.  Of course there may be other 
mechanisms which, on some understanding of what it is to perceive, count as perceptual – there 
may be a mechanism involved in proprioception, for example.  They are irrelevant to the 
question I am discussing.  
16 I am making the (relatively uncontroversial) assumption that our capacity to perceive is 
appropriately explained at the psychological level rather than at any lower level – that 
generalizations in a theory that explains how we perceive will quantify over psychological states 
and processes. 
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I have argued that the best explanation of our everyday classification of perceptions into 
perceptions of five different senses is that it reflects the underlying psychological 
organisation of our perceptual system.  Such a suggestion is plausible only if our 
perceptual system has the appropriate organisation.  One way to determine whether it 
does would be to simply consult a psychological theory of perception.  Unfortunately 
there is, as yet, no such theory to consult.  There are theories, or parts of theories, of 
some aspects of our perceptual system, but nothing like a complete theory.   
How, then, should we proceed?  In what follows I argue that even if we don’t 
have a complete psychological theory of perception, we do know what form a theory that 
distinguishes five kinds of perceptual mechanisms would have.  We know, too, what the 
empirical commitments of a theory of that form are.  In advance of knowing a complete 
psychological theory of perception, therefore, we can attempt to determine whether the 
empirical commitments of a theory of the right form are met.  Although we might never 
be in a position, prior to having a complete theory, to show that the commitments are 
met, we might find evidence that shows that they are not met; that is, we might find 
evidence that rules out the possibility of there being five kinds of sensory mechanism. 
What form would a psychological theory of perception have?  We postulate 
psychological mechanisms in order to explain the psychological capacities of an 
organism, like the capacity of an organism to perceive its environment.  What form 
should the explanation of a psychological capacity have, and how in general can we 
explain such a capacity?  It is commonly supposed that we can explain psychological 
capacities functionally.  The most detailed philosophical account of functional explanation 
is Robert Cummins’s and Jerry Fodor’s (see especially Cummins (1983) and Fodor (1968) 
and see Fodor (1983)).  In what follows I begin by giving a brief account of functional 
explanation, and then describe its empirical commitments.   
According to Cummins, we can explain a complex psychological capacity in the 
same way that we explain any other complex capacity: by analysing it into simpler 
elements.  There are two ways in which this can be done.  We can give what he calls a 
functional analysis of the capacity itself; and we can give a compositional analysis of the system 
which has the capacity.  Since what makes an explanation the explanation of the capacity 
of a particular system is that the system actually realises that capacity, an adequate 
explanation will often require both kinds of analysis.  This sets an empirical constraint on 
the analysis of any capacity of a system: the analysing capacities must be shown to be 
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capacities of the system which has the capacity.  This point should be noted; we will see 
that it has some important consequences. 
Compositional analysis explains a system’s possession of a capacity by 
decomposing the system into parts.  The system’s possession of the capacity is then 
explained “by appeal to the properties of [the system’s] components and their mode of 
organisation” (Cummins 1983, p.15).  Analysing a system in this way has an explanatory 
value “when we come to see that something having the kinds of components specified, 
organised in the way specified, is bound to have the target property” namely, the capacity 
that we want to explain (1983, p.17).  Since the components we use to analyse a complex 
capacity will often themselves have capacities or properties which we want to explain, 
this process of analysis is recursive.   
The functional analysis of a capacity consists in analysing it into a number of 
simpler or less problematic capacities in such a way that the organised activity of the 
analysing capacities amounts to the activity of the analysed capacity.  This has 
explanatory value because we can come to see how a series of relatively simple capacities 
operating together in a certain way can together constitute very complicated capacities. 
The functional analysis of a capacity is often a preliminary step to explaining how 
a system possesses that capacity.  We begin by analysing the capacity into a number of 
simpler capacities, and then explain how some system realises or possesses the complex 
capacity by showing that various component parts of the system themselves realise or 
possess the simple capacities described by our analysis.  Thus functional analysis goes 
together with compositional analysis when we show that the analysing capacities are 
capacities of components of the system.   
Fodor suggests that psychological explanations employ just this methodology; 
such explanations, he says, 
 
have characteristically exhibited two phases that, although they may be 
simultaneous in point of history, are nevertheless distinguishable in point 
of logic…in the first phase of psychological explanation, the primary 
concern is with determining the functional character of the states and 
processes involved in the etiology of behaviour…The second phase…has 
to do with the specification of those biochemical systems that do, in fact, 
exhibit the functional characteristics enumerated by the phase-one 
theories.  (Fodor 1968, pp.107-9.) 
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Although functional analysis often goes together with compositional it doesn’t always do 
so.  Sometimes we can analyse the capacity of a system into other capacities which are 
capacities of the system as a whole, and not capacities of any of its components.  
Consider, for example, the capacity of a cook to bake a cake.  Such a capacity can be 
analysed into a (sequence of) simpler capacities – to break eggs, to follow instructions, to 
mix ingredients together, and so on – which are not capacities of some part of the cook, 
they are just capacities that the cook has; capacities, we might say, of the whole cook.  
We could provide an explanation of the capacity of the cook to bake a cake by providing 
a functional analysis of the capacity, but not a compositional analysis of the cook.   
In practice, when we attempt to explain the capacity of a system we often need to 
analyse the complex capacity of the system into simpler capacities of the system as a 
whole before attempting any compositional analysis of these capacities.  It will often be 
possible to analyse the complex capacity of a system in different ways and, since the 
different analyses will have different implications for the structure of the system which 
instantiates them, it will be important to distinguish these analyses when we come to 
explain the instantiation of a capacity by a particular system.  The same capacity might, 
for example, be the product of two distinct and simpler capacities of the system as a 
whole, or it might be a single complex capacity of the system – we need to know which 
before attempting to provide any further compositional analysis. 
A concrete example is provided by a class of distributed networks which are 
commonly used for simulations of cognition.  Such networks are set up so as to have a 
particular steady state function – to produce a certain kind of output given a certain input 
– but the network can also ‘learn’ to produce a particular output given a particular input.  
We can analyse the complex capacity of this system into two simpler capacities – to 
produce a steady output and to learn – which are both capacities of the whole system or 
network, not of components of it.  Yet the same complex capacity could be implemented 
by a system having two distinct components each possessing a simpler capacity (see 
Shallice 1988, p252). 
If it is to be explanatory of a system’s possession of a capacity the functional 
analysis of the capacity must terminate in capacities which we can show are instantiated 
by the system.  Since there will usually be more than one way in which a capacity can be 
analysed, what makes an analysis an explanation of the capacity of a particular system is 
that the system instantiates the analysing capacities.  If the system doesn’t instantiate the 
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capacities described by our analysis then we will not have explained how this particular 
system has the capacity.  In order to substantiate the claim that we have provided an 
analysis of some capacity of, say, the human brain, we need to show that our analysis is in 
fact instantiated by the brain.  This requirement is what sets an empirical constraint on 
correct analysis.  If, for example, we analysed some complex capacity into two simpler, 
and distinct, capacities of the whole system, we would look for evidence that these 
capacities are in fact independently instantiated by the system, and our claim to have 
provided an analysis will be undermined if we cannot show the analysing capacities to be 
independently instantiated.   
This method of explanation can be used both to explain the operation of a 
complex capacity and the possession of that capacity by a system.  We can think of the 
psychological capacities of an organism as complex capacities instantiated by them, and 
so can use this combination of functional and componential analysis to explain the 
operation and instantiation of the psychological capacities of an organism.   
A complete functional explanation of some capacity of a system has the form of 
a hierarchy of levels.  The top level is simply a description of the capacity to be explained; 
an analysis of this capacity constitutes the next level down, and each of the lower levels 
in turn provides an analysis of the level above.  Each analysis of a higher level capacity is 
constrained by the requirement that the components of the analysis actually be 
instantiated by the system.  If we cannot show that the lower level description is a 
description of capacities of components of the system then we have a reason to reject it 




Suppose that psychological capacities can be given functional explanations.  Then a 
necessary condition for there being five kinds of sensory mechanism is that a functional 
explanation of our capacity to perceive distinguishes independently identifiable sub-
functions, each of which functions in such a way that it can be plausibly to identified 
with the operation of one of the senses. 
Even in the absence of a functional explanation of our capacity to perceive, we 
know what form such an explanation would take were it to analyse the capacity to 
perceive into five distinct sensory capacities.  Given that the capacities of an empirically 
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adequate analysis must be instantiated, we know too what structures or mechanisms the 
brain must instantiate for such an analysis to be correct.   
That means that, in advance of having a complete functional explanation of our 
capacity to perceive, we can look for evidence either that the brain does or does not have 
the relevant structures or mechanisms.  Such evidence would constitute evidence for or 
against the existence of five kinds of sensory mechanism independently of having a 
complete functional explanation.  Evidence of this kind might never be such that we 
could confidently say, in advance of a complete explanation, that there were five kinds of 
sensory mechanism; but it might convince us that there were not five such capacities. 
Isn’t it just obvious that there are five such capacities?  After all, we can use each 
of our five senses independently of the others – we can perceive something by seeing or 
by hearing alone without perceiving it with any other sense.  Doesn’t that suggest that, 
prior to any componential analysis, an initial functional analysis of our capacity to perceive 
should distinguish five independent sub-capacities, one corresponding to each sense?  
And therefore that all we should expect from further analysis of these capacities is an 
explanation of how each of them is actually instantiated by mechanisms in the brain? 
However intuitively obvious it might seem, it doesn’t follow from the fact that 
we can use each of our senses independently of the others that a functional explanation 
will produce an analysis into five sub-capacities.  Distinct capacities that normally operate 
together may realise distinct functions; whether or not they do so depends on their 
overall functional organisation.  Therefore, each independently usable sense may not be a 
single capacity but instead be instantiated by a number of distinct capacities operating 
together.  And there may functionally significant interdependencies between the 
capacities that instantiate what we normally regard as distinct senses, interdependencies 
that in normal circumstances we don’t notice.   
To see this, consider the example of vision.  A capacity is individuated by its 
functional role, its function being to map types of input onto types of output in a certain 
way.17  If a capacity is an input-output mapping, then to claim that a sensory modality is 
instantiated by a single capacity is to claim that there is some mapping of input states 
onto output states of the brain which instantiates it.  We will have identified such a 
capacity when we have identified its inputs and its outputs and the relation between 
                                                 
17 Cummins says that “to ascribe a function to something is to ascribe a capacity to it that is 
singled out by its role in an analysis of some capacity of a containing system”, and that “X has a 
disposition to d if X would manifest d were a certain range of events to occur.  To explain a 
disposition is to explain why d comes about when precipitating conditions occur”.  A disposition 
is the same as a capacity for Cummins, see p.195 n.1. 
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them; two capacities will be identical only if they map the same kind of inputs onto the 
same kind of outputs in the same way.  If vision is a single capacity then it must consist 
of some single mapping of inputs onto outputs.  If there exists no one kind of input, or 
no unique kind of output, then vision would not be a single kind of capacity.  Evidence 
against such uniqueness would be evidence against the claim that vision is a single 
capacity. 
Marr, in his discussion of the function of vision (a function whose hypothetical 
workings he goes on to describe in detail) takes the input to the visual capacity to be fairly 
obvious: 
 
A process may be thought of as a mapping of one representation onto 
another, and in the case of human vision, the initial representation is in no 
doubt – it consists of arrays of image intensity values as detected by the 
photoreceptors of the retina (1982, p.32).18 
 
Whatever the output of vision may be, the input must be the light that is detected by the 
retina.  We might think that something similar is true of the other senses; it is fairly easy 
to distinguish anatomically different sensory ‘transducers’ – those parts of the body – the 
sense organs – which are sensitive to various different kinds of stimuli and hence detect 
different kinds of information about the physical world.  All the information we have 
about the world comes to us thanks to the operation of these transducers, so we know 
that the input to whatever perceptual capacities we have can be no more than what is 
detected by them; and each of them can be used independently of the others.  It might 
seem safe, then, to infer from this that the input of each of the different sensory 
capacities is just what is detected by each sense organ – in the case of vision, arrays of 
light intensity values.  But we want to know whether there is a single capacity 
corresponding to each transducer, and that depends in part on how the transducer itself 
functions.   
The retina contains neurones which are sensitive to different features of the 
visual array, and – a fact “that is often not appreciated” 19 – projections from the 
                                                 
18 Marr talks of processes where I talk of capacities; the difference is not important from the 
point of view of my argument.  
19 Milner and Goodale 1995, p.3. Physiological and anatomical studies have distinguished several 
distinct classes of retinal ganglion cells each of which appears to be involved in the analysis of a 
different aspect of the visual scene.  The cells form two channels of information which remain 
partially segregated through higher cortical regions (see Cowey 1979).  Recently, a similar 
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neurones in the retina travel to a number of different targets in the brain.  So, that the 
retinal image is the input to a single capacity, rather than that different properties of the 
image are inputs to distinct capacities, is an assumption which may turn out to be false.  
It is possible that we could find evidence that there are several kinds of visual output, 
which would be evidence that there is not a single input-output mapping for vision.  That 
would suggest that vision is not a single capacity.  The same may be true of the other 
sense organs: empirical investigation of their function is required to determine whether 
or not it is. 
If it doesn’t follow from the fact that we can use each sense independently of the 
others that there are five kinds of sensory capacity, then what would be evidence for the 
existence of five such capacities?  If the correct analysis of our capacity to perceive 
analyses it into five distinct capacities, one of which is a single visual capacity, then we 
should expect to find a visual capacity instantiated in the brain as a single kind of 
mapping of inputs onto outputs.  If, on the other hand, our visual capacity is analysed 
into two distinct parallel capacities, then we should expect to find it instantiated as two 
distinct input-output mappings in the brain.  The existence of two such visual capacities 
would undermine the identification of our everyday concepts of the senses – in particular 
that of vision – with concepts of kinds of psychological capacity.   
Even before we have a complete psychological theory of perception we can look 
for evidence that there is a single visual capacity instantiated by the brain, so here we 
have a clear example of how we might actually go about deciding whether our concepts 
of the senses are natural kind concepts.  Evidence for or against the claim that the senses 
are natural kinds will therefore take the form of evidence that the brain does or does not 




Suppose that we find evidence that there is not a single input-output mapping for vision.  
That would seem to be enough to undermine the claim that there is a single visual 
capacity, and so undermine any identification of our concept of vision with the concept 
of a natural kind.  The question is not, however, quite so clear cut.  I have been 
supposing that psychological capacities can be explained functionally, and have described 
                                                                                                                                            
neuronal specialisation has been found in the auditory cortex of non-human primates (Romanski 
1999a,b); I discuss this below. 
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what kind of evidence would show that a functional explanation of perception would 
undermine an identification of our concepts of the five senses with psychological 
capacities.   
But the question of whether we can explain the capacity of some system 
functionally is not itself trivial: it depends, in part, on the kind of structure the system 
has.  An adequate functional explanation is one whose analysing capacities can be shown 
to be instantiated by components of the system.  If the organisation of the system whose 
capacities we are attempting to explain doesn’t have a componential structure it will not 
be possible to show that a functional analysis is instantiated by the system – there would 
be no components of the system to instantiate the relevant capacities.  Given that this 
structural organisation is a necessary condition for functional explanation, evidence that 
some system doesn’t instantiate a particular capacity is not necessarily evidence that the 
system lacks that capacity: it may show instead that the system lacks the kind of structure 
that makes functional explanation appropriate. 
According to the model of functional explanation that I have described we can 
explain a psychological capacity by analysing it into sub-capacities; and we can show that 
the analysis is the correct analysis of the capacity of a particular thing or system by 
showing that the analysing capacities are capacities of parts or components of the system, 
that they are instantiated by components of the system.  Suppose, for example, that we 
analyse the complex capacity of some system into two parallel capacities each of which 
are capacities of the system as a whole.   To show that this analysis is correct we would 
need to show that both capacities are in fact instantiated by the system in the way 
described by our analysis.  That means the system must be shown to instantiate two 
independent capacities (together with any component capacities we postulate in further 
analysing these capacities).  If two capacities of the system are independent of one 
another then, since component capacities are, in turn, individuated in terms of their role 
in the analysis, each set of their component capacities must themselves be independent 
of one another.  So, in order to show that such an analysis is the correct analysis of the 
capacity of the particular system that we are attempting to explain we need to show that 
the system has components which instantiate those capacities in the way described by the 
analysis.  If the analysing capacities are not instantiated then we cannot claim to have 
provided an analysis of the capacity of this particular system: although we might have 
provided an analysis of the capacity, and so given an explanation of how some arbitrary 
system could have this capacity, we would not have explained how this particular system 
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actually has the capacity.  If we can’t show that the system really instantiates two 
independent capacities, then our analysis will not be the correct explanation of the 
capacity of this system.  This kind of procedure is described by Fodor: 
 
having arrived at a … theory of the kinds of operations performed by the 
mechanisms that are causally responsible for behaviour, one then “looks inside” 
to see whether or not the nervous system does in fact contain parts capable of 
performing the alleged functions… The physiological psychologist’s task of 
determining what, if any, organisation into subsystems the nervous system of an 
organism exhibits is precisely the problem of determining whether the nervous 
system has subsystems whose functional characteristics correspond with those 
required by antecedently plausible psychological theories…it is clear that a 
psychological theory that attributes to an organism a state of process that the 
organism has no physiological process capable of realising is ipso facto 
incorrect…If no such mechanisms exist, then the [analysis of that capacity] is the 
wrong model for the functional organisation [of that capacity]  (1968, pp.109-
110). 
 
If the nervous system doesn’t have subsystems that correspond to our theory, then the 
theory doesn’t provide an explanation of the psychological capacity or associated 
behaviour.  Therefore if the model of functional explanation is to be applicable to the 
various psychological capacities – capacities like vision and memory – that we ordinarily 
attribute to people, then the system which instantiates these capacities – the human 
nervous system and brain – must have a certain kind of structure, it must have what 
Fodor calls a ‘modular’ structure: that is, it’s various distinct capacities must be 
implemented by collections of sub-components – parts of the nervous system and brain 
– which are themselves independent of one another.20  Were the brain to lack this kind of 
modular structure then we could not explain its capacities functionally because there 
                                                 
20 For Fodor (who introduced the term in his 1983 book) a module is actually a sub-component 
with a special set of properties: “A module is, inter alia, an informationally encapsulated 
computational system – an inference making mechanism whose access to background 
information is constrained by general features of cognitive architecture, hence relatively rigidly 
and relatively permanently constrained” (1990, pp.200-1).  The term ‘modular’ is now often used 
to describe functionally specialised sub-component structures which lack these properties; such 
structures are modular in a weaker sense than Fodor’s. 
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would be no way to determine empirically which of two alternative analyses of the same 
psychological capacity was correct.   
Given the empirical commitments of this form of psychological explanation, and 
in advance of a complete explanation of perception, evidence against the existence of five 
sensory capacities corresponding to the five senses will be equivocal.  On the one hand, 
we could take it to be evidence that the correct functional explanation of the senses will 
not in fact distinguish five sensory capacities; on the other hand, we could take it as 
evidence that the human nervous system and brain lacks the kind of modular structure 




Functional explanation of the form I have described sets a very strong constraint on 
explanation.  Psychologists can and do construct explanations of people’s psychological 
capacities, and they do so by constructing models of how those capacities are realised in 
the brain.  Such explanations often distinguish capacities at one level even when they are 
produced by the operations of sub-capacities which are not entirely distinct at a lower 
level.  If that’s so then, in practice at least, psychologists don’t necessarily individuate 
analysing capacities by their role in the analysis of higher level capacities, since they may 
also play a role in the analysis of other capacities that we distinguish at the higher level.  
In effect we can see functional explanation as placing too strong a constraint on adequate 
explanation – a constraint that has the effect of making it too easy to find evidence 
against a proposed explanation of a capacity.  Couldn’t there be other, less demanding 
ways of empirically determining which of two (or more) alternative analyses of a 
psychological capacity is a correct analysis of the capacity of the brain?  If our model of 
psychological explanation is to be consistent with psychological practice, then we need to 
weaken the instantiation requirement on adequate explanation, and hence raise the level 
of evidence required to show that a particular analysis is not instantiated by a system.  
What form should this model of explanation take, and what kind of evidence do 
psychologists in practise appeal to in providing an analysis of a particular psychological 
capacity?  The best way to answer these questions is to consider a concrete example: the 
explanation of memory.  I’ve simplified it somewhat, to make the point more clearly. 
We know that memory is the capacity to store certain kinds of information; we 
don’t know what kind of information is stored in what way, nor do we know how it is 
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stored.  If we want an explanation of our memory capacity then we must begin by 
attempting to characterise the capacity to remember in detail.  On the face of it there is 
more than one way to characterise a person’s capacity to remember things.  We might 
characterise it as a single, general purpose capacity which can be used to remember any 
kind of information; or as consisting of several distinct capacities to remember different 
kinds of information: the capacity to remember the way to get into the centre of town 
may be a different capacity to the capacity to remember how to perform a mathematical 
calculation, or to remember the date of one’s birthday, or to remember the smell of a 
flower.  An explanation of memory must begin, therefore, with the most detailed 
description that we can give of a normal person’s capacity to remember.  The content of 
such a description may be far from obvious; as Churchland comments, what the mind is 
doing “even described at the level of input-output functions of the system – is not an 
observational matter, to be read off simply by looking at the behaving organism.  Rather, 
it is a deeply theoretical matter.  Some initial theory is essential to get the whole 
enterprise going…”.21  The theory here will take the form of hypotheses about the role of 
memory in various kinds of behaviour.  That is, we hypothesise psychological capacities 
which are responsible for people’s behaviour.  The capacities we hypothesise must be 
sufficiently complex to account for whatever behavioural abilities people are shown to 
possess.  Producing this kind of description is likely to involve a certain amount of 
empirical investigation: we need to experiment, to test people, and so on, in order to 
determine what they can do.  Once we have discovered what people can do – what they 
can remember and in what circumstances – and produced an analysis of their capacity, 
we can attempt to locate the mechanisms which instantiate the capacities postulated by 
our analysis.   
I have suggested that failing to find such mechanisms does not show that the 
analysis of the particular capacity we are attempting to explain is incorrect; it may simply 
be that the capacity is instantiated by a system which lacks the required kind of structure.  
How, then, do psychologists determine whether an analysis – a theory of memory – is 
correct? 
When constructing an account of people’s capacity to remember – a 
psychological theory or model of memory – psychologists don’t just use evidence of 
what people can do, they use evidence of what they can’t do: their theories are often 
based on studies of the abilities of people with brain damage.  By studying what 
                                                 
21 Churchland 1989, p.374; and see Fodor 1968, Ch.3. 
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capacities remain intact in the absence of others – by looking at how capacities dissociate 
when the brain is damaged – it is possible to learn about the structure of the intact 
capacity.  Shallice provides a succinct explanation of the kind of methodology employed: 
 
The importance of dissociations stems from an inferential asymmetry between 
associations and dissociations, if observed impairments faithfully reflect damage 
to an underlying modular system.  If one patient shows an association between 
two types of deficit and a second shows a dissociation, with one of the abilities 
being preserved, then a simple explanation of the overall pattern exists.  The 
observed dissociation can be presumed to arise from a lesion that has affected 
only one side of a functional line of cleavage in the modular system; the 
association is presumed to result from a lesion that has crossed this line.22 
 
In fact it is more important to look for double, rather than single, dissociations between 
two abilities.  Two abilities are doubly dissociated if each one can be impaired without 
the other being so.  This suggests that different underlying psychological capacities or 
mechanisms are required for the two abilities.  A double dissociation is more significant 
than a single dissociation because a single dissociation is compatible with the possibility 
that the same capacities underlie the two abilities, but that the impaired ability simply 
taxes those capacities more heavily (and so stops working first, or works much less well, 
when they are damaged). 
This approach has proved useful for understanding the mechanisms of memory.23  
In some people with damaged brains, memory impairment – amnesia – occurs as a 
circumscribed disorder, without any cognitive impairment.  Although we tend to think of 
memory as a single capacity to remember things, the study of people with amnesia has 
provided evidence for distinguishing two kinds of memory: short and long term memory.  
People with amnesia can remember things for short periods of time, but not for longer 
periods.  One psychologist of memory concludes that such results “suggest a distinction 
between at least two kinds of memory” (Squire 1989, p.504) – or two kinds of capacity: 
the capacity to remember things for short periods of time, and the capacity to remember 
things for longer periods of time.  People with amnesia are in fact often able to learn 
                                                 
22 Shallice 1988, p.35.  This methodological approach is relatively recent and interest in it has 
greatly increased over the past 25 years or so.  Shallice’s book is an excellent discussion of its 
theoretical underpinnings.  Note that Shallice is using ‘modular’ in a weaker sense that Fodor. 
23 Some of the relevant evidence is summarised in Squire 1989. 
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things – they are often able to learn how to perform certain motor, perceptual, and 
cognitive tasks.  They can, in other words, still remember some kinds of things for longer 
periods of time, which suggests that we should distinguish different kinds of long term 
memory. It is this kind of evidence psychologists appeal to in attempting to characterise a 
particular psychological capacity that they want to explain; it’s evidence that, in the case 
of memory, appears to show that what we thought of as a unitary capacity is in fact the 
joint operation of distinct capacities. 
Although this evidence suggests that we need distinguish different kinds of 
memory it is possible that the kind of fragmentation of capacities revealed by amnesia 
has no functional significance and does not reflect the underlying structure of the 
mechanisms of memory.  In order to show that the analysis is correct we need to show 
that these different capacities are in fact instantiated by the brain; if we are not able to do 
so, we would have to go back and revise our initial characterisation.  But do they need to 
be instantiated, in the way required by functional analysis, by a strongly modular 
structure?  No, because there are other kinds of brain structure which would produce the 
patterns of dissociation which count as evidence of distinct capacities of the system.24  
Suppose, for example, that each of two sub-capacities can function effectively without 
the other, but that there is some interaction between them.  The interaction might be 
such that, for example, the two capacities are not able to produce conflicting outputs.  
According to the model of functional explanation, such interactions would rule out 
viewing these sub-capacities as components of distinct higher-level capacities, and yet in 
the situation in which one of these sub-capacities is damaged, the other may continue to 
function more or less normally.  In that case it may be appropriate to treat each sub-
capacity as a component in two different higher-level capacities.  Our decision to treat 
these sub-capacities as distinct from one another may depend on whether we can specify 
the functions of each of the capacities of which they are part independently of one 
another.  Evidence from a higher level – relating damage to a particular structure to 
changes in a subject’s behaviour, for example – may lead us to treat components that 
interact at a lower level as distinct.  Alternatively, suppose that two capacities are realised 
in overlapping areas of the brain.  One capacity A might require regions X and Z of the 
cortex, and another capacity B might require regions Y and Z.  Higher-level evidence 
                                                 
24 For further discussion, see Shallice 1988, Ch.11.  Farah (1994) discusses several dissociations 
that she argues could be explained in terms of damage to a non-modular system.  The 
interpretation of the sensory dissociations that I describe below in terms of damage to a modular 
or functionally specialized system is supported by anatomical evidence that is absent in the cases 
Farah describes 
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might lead us to count X and Y as contributing to the function of two independent 
capacities, even though they are not realised independently of one another.  Despite 
interactions, we would still regard A and B as distinct.25 
We should view the relation between a single sub-capacity and the rest of the 
system in which it is embedded as on a continuum.  Our decision as to whether to treat 
two capacities as genuinely distinct or not will be determined by the extent to which the 
operation of a sub-capacity depends on outputs of other sub-capacities of the system of 
which it is a part, and how they relate to the state of the rest of the system.  There may 
be certain relations between sub-capacities which are of far greater importance to the 
operation of the capacity than others; we can group together and distinguish components 
on the basis of the strength or importance of the connections between them.  For as long 
as all the components of a capacity have strong connections to one another, and weak 
connections to the components of other capacities, we can view the components as 
genuinely instantiating that capacity and the capacity as genuinely distinct from others. 
It is possible, then, to say when some proposed analysis of a capacity has a 
genuine functional significance even when the system whose capacity we are attempting 
to explain lacks a strongly modular structure.  The difference between this approach – 
explanation in terms of functional specialisation – and functional explanation is that it 
allows that there is explanatory value to an analysis which shows how complex capacities 
can emerge from the interaction of functionally specialised components, even when we 
cannot precisely characterise the function of those components and the contribution they 
make to the system as a whole, and even when they don’t stand in the very tight 
relationships to the analysed capacity required by functional analysis.  This approach still 
makes an empirical assumption, namely that the brain has functionally specialised regions 
rather than having a general homogenous form, but there is ample evidence – from 




I have been describing what would be evidence for and against the claim that the human 
perceptual system consists of five kinds of psychological mechanism, and have suggested 
                                                 
25 Overlapping or shared cortical areas doesn’t entail the existence of a single function.  Two 
distinct processes can overlap, and may do so when areas of the cortex contain differently 
sensitive neurons.  So what may seem like an ‘obvious’ shared input to e.g. vision or audition, can 
in fact be an input to more than one process or function. 
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that philosophical accounts of psychological explanation – which view psychological 
explanation as a form of functional explanation – have an implausibly high a standard of 
empirical adequacy.  When we look at examples of actual explanations we find that, in 
practice, psychologists treat as distinct capacities that are instantiated by components that 
are not entirely independent of one another, for as long as they have evidence that those 
capacities form part of functionally specialised subsystems.  Given the structure of the 
brain and nervous system, this weaker model of functional explanation is an appropriate 
model for explaining human psychological capacities and the human perceptual system.   
The question of whether the human perceptual system consists of five kinds of 
psychological mechanism is, therefore, the question of whether the brain instantiates five 
functionally specialised perceptual capacities corresponding to each of the senses.   
If our everyday concept of seeing is the concept of a kind of perceptual 
mechanism, then our capacity to see must be instantiated by a single kind of 
psychological process.  Evidence that vision is instantiated by a single process will be 
evidence that there is a single functionally significant process whose operation enables us 
to see.  In fact, there is evidence that suggests this isn’t the case. 
The primate visual system comprises a large number of anatomically distinct 
visual areas, each of which appears to process information about different aspects of the 
visual scene.  Different areas are specialised for processing information about colour, 
motion, pattern, form, depth, and various other attributes (evidence for their function 
comes from a number of sources including, for example, deficits following brain damage, 
evidence of selective responsiveness of neurons in the area, and functional brain imaging 
(Zeki 1993).  There are many interconnections between these areas, amongst which two 
significant pathways – a dorsal pathway and a ventral pathway – have been indentified.26  
The primary visual cortex (to which the majority of neurons from the retina ultimately 
project) makes a different contribution to each pathway so that although its destruction 
completely deprives ‘ventral’ neurons of visual input, ‘dorsal’ neurons remain responsive.  
They do so in virtue of the role played by subcortical visual areas in the dorsal, but not 
the ventral pathway.  The different cortical and subcortical areas involved in the two 
pathways suggests the dual-stream hypothesis: the hypothesis that these two anatomically 
distinct pathways implement distinct and relatively functionally independent 
psychological processes. Strongest support for this hypothesis comes from 
                                                 
26 The dorsal pathway links the primary visual cortex through the middle temporal area to the 
posterior parietal lobe, and the ventral pathway which links the primary visual cortex, through 
area V4, to the inferotemporal region.   
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neuropsychological studies of subjects with brain damage.  The cases are relatively well 
known, and I shall describe them only briefly.27 
Cortical blindness is the result of bilateral lesions in the occipital lobe of the brain 
involving the primary visual cortex.  These lesions mean that although the eyes and optic 
nerve could function normally, subjects cannot see objects in their blind field.  We might 
expect damage to the primary visual cortex to produce complete deafferentation from 
the retina, but some cortically blind subjects are able to respond to visual stimuli.  This 
phenomenon has become known as blindsight.  Subjects with blindsight are unable to 
report the presence or nature of objects presented in their blind field and so are often 
said to be visually unaware of such objects.  Their residual visual capacity can only be 
detected when they are placed in forced choice situations, in which they are encouraged 
to make a response, either by moving their eyes or by reaching or pointing, to a target 
object that they deny they can see.  They are able to discriminate and localise such 
objects at levels well above chance.   
A similar dissociation between awareness and action is found in some subjects 
with visual agnosia.  Subjects with apperceptive agnosia are not blind, but are unable to 
perceive or recognise objects; they can detect visual features and have good acuity, but 
don’t experience features as surfaces or as grouped into objects, and so cannot perceive 
shapes nor recognise objects.28  One such subject, DF, suffered damage to her visual 
cortex following carbon monoxide poisoning.  As a result she was unable to recognise 
everyday objects and faces, couldn’t identify simple shapes, and had subnormal colour 
perception.  She couldn’t judge or use her fingers to show how big objects were or in 
which orientations.  Despite these substantial visual impairments, she was normally 
accurate when object orientation and size were used to guide an action.  Although she 
couldn’t judge when objects were the same or different in shape, when she had to pick 
up an object she adjusted her fingers to grip it optimally; and when she had to post a card 
through a slot her movements were fluid and accurate, even though she could not match 
                                                 
27 That they function relatively independently of one another was first suggested by studies of 
brain-lesioned monkeys.  This led to a distinction between a ‘what’ and a ‘where’ function – one 
stream functions to compute information about objects’ size and shape, the other – dorsal stream 
– to compute information about its spatial location.  The neuropsychological studies I describe 
below have been taken to show that the distinction should not be understood in terms of the 
different kinds of information computed by each stream, but the use to which the information is 
put.  Not a ‘what’ stream and a ‘where’ stream, but ‘vision for judgment’ and ‘vision for action’. 
28 Associative agnosics, in contrast, can perceive objects normally, but are unable to attach a 
name to them.  For more details, see Farah 1994.  The dissociation between vision and action is 
associated only with apperceptive agnosia. 
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the orientation of the slot with another.29  As with blindsighted subjects, although she 
lacks visual awareness of properties of objects, DF is able to use visual information about 
those properties to guide her actions.   
Subjects with optic ataxia – typically following damage to the posterior parietal 
cortex – have visuo-motor deficits, and are unable to reach accurately for visually 
presented objects or to accurately grasp an object between finger and thumb or orient a 
card correctly for posting through a slot.  They are nonetheless able to make accurate 
perceptual reports of the location and orientation of visually presented objects, and they 
can accurately indicate the size of an object with their fingers or rotate a slot to match the 
orientation of one presented to them. Their difficulty in reaching towards and grasping 
objects cannot, therefore, be explained in terms of their lacking perceptual awareness of 
the relevant properties of objects.  Nor do they simply have a motor deficit since they 
can perform non-visually-guided actions normally; they can, for example, reach to places 
on their own body with normal accuracy.  Although the exact form of deficit produced 
by optic ataxia varies from subject to subject it is best explained in terms of an underlying 
deficit in a visuo-motor system – that is, a system that functions to produce visually 
guided actions – that can be damaged at different points.30  Subjects with optic ataxia 
have intact visual perception, but an impaired ability to use visual information to guide 
their action, and therefore show a dissociation between perception and action which is 
the reverse of that found in subjects with blindsight or agnosia. 
In these neuropsychological cases, selective damage to the visual system affecting 
only one of the two visual pathways produces a visual dissociation.  Damage to the 
ventral pathway leaves subjects unable to perceive visually presented objects, but able to 
use visual information about those objects in guiding their actions; damage to the dorsal 
stream leaves subjects able to perceive objects, but apparently unable to use visual 
information to guide actions directed towards objects they can see.  This pattern of 
dissociation supports the hypothesis that the two visual pathways implement functionally 
independent processes: one which enables subjects to use visual information to guide 
object directed actions, and the other which enables the visual perception of objects 
required for subjects to make judgements about them, form intentions to act on them, 
and to select and discriminate amongst them. 
                                                 
29 See Milner and Goodale 1995.  Perenin and Rosetti (1996) describe a blindsight patient who 
was asked to post a card through a slot and grasp blocks in the blind field.  Although the subject 
lacked awareness (couldn’t report, denied seeing, etc.) their posting was accurate and grasping 
appropriate for the object. 
30 Milner and Goodale 1995, pp. 92ff. 
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The problem this poses for the view that in distinguishing the senses we are 
distinguishing between kinds of sensory mechanism is that there isn’t a single mechanism 
of vision corresponding to our concept of seeing.  The evidence I have described 
suggests that there are at least two distinct mechanisms or processes involved in vision.  
If there are two mechanisms then our common-sense concept of vision fails to refer to a 
single kind of mechanism; that is, it fails to refer.31  And if there are two mechanisms, 
then appealing to perceptual mechanisms will not answer the constitutive question – it 
won’t tell us what all instances of visual perceiving have in common in virtue of which 
they are instances of seeing. 
It might be objected that although the evidence I have described shows that there 
is more than one visual process, it doesn’t show that our common sense concept of 
vision fails to refer to a single process.  The evidence shows a dissociation between the 
visual process implemented in the ventral stream which produces conscious perceptions, 
and the visual process implemented in the dorsal stream which controls action.  If the 
reference of our concept of vision is fixed in the way I described above, in terms of the 
causal process that plays a role in producing our perceptions of certain kinds of features 
of objects, then our concept will refer to the process which plays a role in producing our 
conscious perceptions; that is, the process implemented in the ventral stream alone.  That 
there is a distinct process which controls action doesn’t show that in thinking about the 
process which produces perception we don’t successfully refer to a single psychological 
process. 
There are two replies that can be made to this objection.32  First, the objection 
supposes that we think of vision simply as the process that produces conscious 
perceptions of things, and not more generally as the process that produces conscious 
perceptions of things and which enables us to act successfully on things that we can see.  
But it’s not clear that we do think of vision in that narrower way.  Suppose that you pick 
up an object that you can see.  If you were asked why you moved your hand to that place 
(the place the object was) you are likely to say that it was because that is where you saw 
the object to be.  It may not have been a conscious perception that guided your action to 
that place but, nonetheless, you appeal to vision in explaining your action.  If that’s right 
                                                 
31 The situation is similar to the jadeite/nephrite case that Putnam describes (1975, p. 241).  In 
effect a presupposition of our reference fixing – that the majority of the things we refer to belong 
to a single kind – fails. 
32 A third kind of response challenges the idea that the experiential states involved in perception 
are distinct from those involved in the control of action. For an example of such a challenge, see 
Nudds forthcoming. 
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then we don’t think of vision simply as the process that produces conscious perception, 
and so our reference fixing procedures don’t pick out only the visual process 
implemented in the ventral stream. 
Second, the objection – even if successful – cannot provide a general method for 
defending a natural-kinds account of the senses since it applies only to the case of vision, 
and yet the psychological structure of the visual system that undermines the claim that 
vision is not a single capacity is not unique to vision; it reflects a general organisational 
principle of the human brain.  The processes which instantiate the other senses are 
similarly modular and task-dependent in organisation and we are likely to find that they 
are not instantiated by a single psychological mechanism.  Just this is true for the only 
other sense that has been studied in any detail: auditory perception. 
The functional organisation of the auditory system is far less well understood 
than that of the visual system; however, just as the existence of a number of 
circumscribed and specific visual deficits provides evidence for modularity in vision so a 
number of similarly circumscribed hearing deficits provide similar evidence for the 
modularity of the auditory system.  These deficits include, for example, cortical deafness 
– deafness caused by damage to the brain rather than the ears; pure word deafness – 
which is an inability to understand spoken words despite intact hearing, speech 
production, and reading ability; auditory agnosia – the auditory analogue of visual 
apperceptive agnosia; and phonoagnosia – which is an impaired ability to recognise 
familiar voices.  Since the modules could all be subcomponents of a single processing 
stream a modular structure alone is not inconsistent with the existence a single auditory 
processing system, but three kinds of evidence suggests that these modules are organised 
into at least two functionally independent systems.  The evidence is anatomical (from 
non-human primates), neuropsychological,33 and from functional imaging data. 
Neurophysiological studies of non-human primates have described distinct 
projections from areas of the auditory cortex which respond to different auditory 
information, along dorsal and ventral pathways (Romanski et al. 1999a, b).  One of the 
pathways responds to auditory spatial information, the other to non-spatial information; 
this suggests that they implement different processes.  The suggestion is supported by 
functional imaging studies.  A number of imaging studies, using fMRI and PET, have 
attempted to determine the extent to which sound identification and sound localisation 
                                                 
33 The deficits may be double-dissociated, which suggests that they should be explained in terms 
of damage to a functionally specialised or modular system (see Polster, 1998).   
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involve different neural pathways.  In one such study (Alain et al 2001) subjects had 
either to say whether two sounds appeared to come from the same or different locations, 
or whether they had the same pitch.   Different brain areas, corresponding to the 
pathways identified anatomically, are activated for the two different tasks.  The authors 
conclude that the neural systems involved in identifying and localising auditory objects 
are functionally and neuroanatomically segregated.34  These results have been reproduced 
in a number of similar studies.35   
Subjects with normal hearing can effortlessly recognise a wide range of 
environmental sounds – such as the sounds produced by dropped objects, by poured 
liquids, and by animals – and are often able to localise the source of such sounds on the 
basis of hearing them.  Subjects with auditory agnosia have adequate hearing but are 
unable to recognise familiar sounds and so are unable, for example, to match a sound to 
a picture of the kind of object that makes the sound.  Although it often occurs together 
with other auditory deficits, auditory agnosia can occur as a circumscribed disorder.  
Subjects with spatial hearing deficits may be unable to localise the source of a sound or 
perceive its motion, and so unable to indicate the position on their head corresponding 
to the apparent location of a sound played over headphones, or the direction – right-to-
left or left-to-right – in which the source appears to move.36  Several case studies have 
described subjects who are able to perceive the location and movement of the source of 
sounds, but have severe auditory agnosia and so cannot recognise the sounds, and others 
who are unable to localise sound sources or perceive movement, but have a normal 
ability to recognise sounds.37  The deficits are the result of lesions localised the parts of 
the brain corresponding to the two anatomically identified pathways.  The double-
dissociation is consistent with the evidence from functional imaging, and suggests that 
the processes that subserve auditory recognition and auditory spatial perception can 
function independently of one another.  This suggests that, as in the case of vision, the 
                                                 
34 Meander 2001 describes an fMRI study to determine whether auditory information relevant to 
recognition and localisation are processed by distinct neural populations.  They found that 
differences in patterns of activation were apparent in passive listening tests, suggesting that the 
difference is not due to motor aspects of the task, but rather corresponds to “an organisational 
principle of the human auditory cortex”. 
35 A recent survey of 36 imaging studies (Arnott et al. 2004) found that the results were consistent 
with the two-systems model of auditory organisation in humans. 
36 The apparent location and movement of sound sources in the azimuthal plane can be varied by 
changing the inter-aural time difference of the sound when played over headphones. 
37 For example, Clark et al. (2000) describe four patients with localised brain lesions, two of 
whom have normal auditory localisation and motion detection, but severe impairment of auditory 
sound recognition.  Their visual perception was normal. 
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auditory system comprises at least two independent functionally specialised capacities,38 
one of which is involved in sound recognition and the other in the localisation of sound 
sources.39   
This functional organisation undermines the claim that auditory perception 
involves the operation of a single perceptual mechanism, and so undermines the 
suggestion that in distinguishing the senses we are distinguishing between kinds of 
sensory mechanism.  There isn’t a single auditory mechanism corresponding to our 
everyday concept of hearing; there are at least two distinct mechanisms.  Therefore our 
common-sense concept fails to refer.  Since both auditory processes contribute to the 
conscious perception of sounds and their sources – each process enables us to perceive 
different features of sound sources – the reply I considered to the visual case – that only 
one of the two processes enables us to perceive and so only one is the reference of our 
common-sense concept – cannot be made here. 
Although I have only considered two senses, the general pattern that emerges 
suggests that the psychological organisation of the perceptual system in general just 
doesn’t correspond to the distinction we make between five senses.  In both cases what 
we regard as a single sense is implemented in distinct psychological mechanisms.  In 
addition to this fractioning or splitting of mechanisms within a sense, evidence is 
emerging of a great deal of interaction between the processes that implement distinct 
senses.40  Such multi- or inter-sensory processes play a role in explaining the unified 
nature of our experience that I described above, and are responsible for illusions such as 
the McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDonald 1976).  I hope to discuss of the 
implications of these interactions – both for an account of the distinction between senses 
and for perception more generally – on another occasion, but it is worth pointing out 
                                                 
38 There may be more than two.  Ducommun et al. (2002) describe a patient with circumscribed 
cortical motion deafness but intact ability to localise sound sources, suggesting that the 
mechanisms underlying these capacities are distinct.  Their data “support the existence of highly 
specialised and partially overlapping processing networks for both sound localisation and sound 
motion perception” (p.86). 
39 The two systems in auditory perception are widely described as implementing ‘what’ and 
‘where’ processes that are distinct in virtue of computing different kinds of information about 
sound sources; although the initial characterizations of the two systems in vision was similarly in 
terms of ‘what’ and ‘where’ (as informationally distinct) they are better characterized as a vision-
for-action system and a vision-for-perception system, where both systems may process the same 
kind of information (both, for example, process spatial information) but each has a different 
function.  I know of no attempts to distinguish in audition the role of spatial information in 
guiding action from the role of spatial information in perception. 
40 Two recent collections presenting some of this evidence are Spence and Driver 2004, and 
Calvert, Spence and Stein 2004. 
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that the existence of psychological mechanisms that play a role in producing our 
perceptions and which are inter-sensory is further evidence against the suggestion that 
the senses are psychological kinds.  It’s not just that a psychological theory of perception 
distinguishes more sensory processes than we commonly distinguish senses, it 
distinguishes processes in a way that cross-cuts our common-sense distinction.  
I have described evidence that two senses – vision and audition – are not realised 
by single processes, but that perceptions that we commonly categorise as of a single 
sense may in fact be produced by the operation of two (or more) processes.  That, I 
think, undermines the suggestion that the senses are natural kinds – it undermines the 
suggestion that the distinction we actually make between different senses tracks a natural 
distinction between kinds of psychological processes,41 and it shows that we cannot 
appeal to the psychological processes involved in perception to answer the question with 
which I began: What do all instances of seeing have in common in virtue of which they 
are instances of seeing?  Whatever it is they have in common – whatever it is that makes 





The senses are not sensory mechanisms, but does it follow that they are not natural 
kinds: couldn’t they be a different – non-psychological – kind of kind?  Might they not, 
for example, be kinds of sense organ, or kinds of (neuro-)anatomical structure, or 
mechanisms individuated in terms of their sensitivity to different kinds of energy or 
stimuli?  The answer, I think, is no.   
Kinds of anatomical structure are individuated relative to a theory of anatomy, 
and in general such a theory will make distinctions – in terms of structures of nerves and 
so on – that are more fine-grained than those made by psychological theories.  
Anatomical structures may be grouped into larger structures in virtue of their functional 
organisation; these larger structures are then individuated in terms of the theory that 
describes their functional organisation.  It follows that if the senses are not psychological 
kinds then they are not anatomical kinds either.  Psychological theories group together 
                                                 
41 Of course, psychologists describe the processes as visual processes and auditory processes, but 
that is just because they both play a role in producing perceptions which common-sense labels as 
visual and auditory.  Independently of the fact that we commonly distinguish five senses, the 
psychological organisation of our perceptual system wouldn’t give us grounds for distinguishing 
five kinds of sense. 
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anatomical structures in virtue of their functional organisation.  If two processes are 
psychologically distinct, then they will be instantiated by distinct groupings of anatomical 
structures; conversely, evidence that two processes are not anatomically distinct would be 
evidence that the processes are not distinct at the psychological level.  There are not five 
kinds of psychological mechanism therefore there are not five kinds of anatomical 
structure either; and the argument that the senses are not kinds of psychological 
mechanism entails that the senses are not kinds of anatomical structure.   
There are well-known and decisive objections to the idea that the senses might be 
kinds of sense organ.  These objections point out that there can be no explanation of 
why we distinguish five kinds of sense organ which is independent of the fact that we 
distinguish five kinds of sense modality,42 and hence that appealing to kinds of sense 
organ will not explain why we distinguish five senses.  The very same objection can be 
made to the suggestion that in distinguishing senses we are distinguishing perceptions 
that are produced by different kinds of stimuli.  Although the perceptions we distinguish 
are brought about by processes that involve sensitivity to different kinds of stimuli, there 
can be no explanation of why we distinguish five senses in terms of the stimuli that bring 
them about.  Different kinds of stimuli produce perceptions we commonly think of as 
perceptions of a single sense, and the same kind of stimulus can produce perceptions that 
we commonly think of as of different senses.  Light shades into heat, sound waves into 
felt vibrations, smell into taste, and so on.   
There is a reason for thinking that if the senses are natural kinds then they must 
be psychological kinds.  If our concepts of the senses are natural-kind concepts then 
their references will be fixed in terms of how our perceptions are brought about.  An 
account of how our perceptions are brought about will be an account that explains those 
perceptions; an account that explains perceptions will be a psychological account.43  If, 
therefore, we distinguish the perceptions of different senses in terms of the way they 
were brought about then we are distinguishing them in terms of the kinds of 
psychological mechanisms or process that produced them.  So if our concepts of the five 
senses are natural-kind concepts, then they are concepts of kinds of psychological 
mechanisms; and if the senses are not kinds of psychological mechanisms then they are 
not natural kinds. 
                                                 
42 See, for example, Roxbee-Cox 1970, p.533. 
43 Explanations must capture significant generalizations and generalizations across perceptual 
states will be at the psychological level; a perceptual state is also a physical state, but a physical 
explanation of a perceptual state will be too specific to explain the occurrence of a kind of 





I have argued that, for the two senses that I have examined at least, a necessary condition 
for their being natural kinds is not met, and hence our concepts of those senses do not 
refer to natural kinds.  This conclusion follows because there are not five kinds of 
sensory mechanism corresponding to our common-sense concepts of five senses.  
Whatever those common-sense concepts are concepts of, they cannot be concepts of 
kinds of sensory mechanism, and so are not natural kind concepts. 
It might be objected that this conclusion only follows if our common-sense 
distinction is correct and we really do have five senses.  What reason is there to conclude 
from the fact that there are not five sensory mechanisms that our concepts are not 
natural kind concepts rather than that our common-sense distinction is mistaken?  
Doesn’t the psychological evidence show that in fact we have more than five senses? 
Our folk-scientific concepts are often wrong.  The situation with respect to our 
common-sense concepts of the senses would be the same as that with respect to many 
other common-sense distinctions or classifications.  In these other cases, if we discover 
that our concepts don’t correspond to natural kinds, we revise our concepts.  When it 
was discovered that jade and nephrite, instances of which we treated as being of the same 
kind, are in fact of different kinds, we didn’t conclude that our concepts were not 
concepts of kinds of minerals, but that we were mistaken.   If we thought that, then we 
would be adopting an error theory of the senses.  We make a distinction between five 
senses, but the distinction we make is wrong.  
In the case of the five senses, I think it’s more plausible to think that our 
concepts are not concepts of natural kinds than that the distinction is mistaken.  This is 
for two reasons.  Firstly, the initial reason for claiming that our concepts might be 
concepts of natural kinds is that, if true, it explains the distinction we make between 
different senses.  But if there are no natural kinds corresponding to our concepts, then 
the claim doesn’t explain the distinction, and that reason is undermined.  To maintain an 
error-theory of the senses, we need some additional reason for thinking that our 
common-sense concepts are (failed) natural kind concepts. 
The second, and more decisive, reason is that our concepts of the five senses are 
common-sense folk psychological concepts, as central as any to our understanding of 
ourselves and others.  For most, if not all, folk psychological states, being in a state of 
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one kind, rather than another, matters; it has some explanatory significance, often 
because being in that kind of state has consequences for one’s behaviour – one’s 
judgements and actions.  In giving an account of folk psychological states, in saying what 
makes them different from one another, we aim to spell out these consequences; in 
giving an account of what is characteristic of different kinds of psychological states we 
must give an account of their explanatory significance. It is plausible to think that 
concepts of these different states are part of our folk psychological repertoire of 
concepts because of the explanatory significance being in one rather than another such 
state has. 
Now the problem with an error-theory of some common-sense folk-
psychological concept or distinction is that it rules out the possibility of giving any 
account of the explanatory significance of the concept or distinction.  This is because 
concepts which fail to refer cannot feature in true explanations; the concept of vision 
fails to refer, so that someone sees something cannot be explanatory of any of their 
subsequent behaviour.  If we think that the fact that someone sees something is 
explanatory, and if in general we think that the distinction we make between different 
senses has an explanatory significance then, we should reject an error-theory of the 
senses.44 
So where does that leave my attempt to say what a sense modality is?  There are, 
I think, a number of options.  First, my suggestion that in distinguishing perceptions into 
the perceptions of different senses we are distinguishing them on the basis of how they 
were produced could be rejected.  That suggestion depended in part on the idea that 
experience is transparent to introspection.  If that is wrong then perhaps there are 
differences in the character of the experiences involved in the perceptions of different 
senses.  Or it might be suggested that two experiences can differ in their 
phenomenological character without differing in the objects and properties to which we 
can attend in introspecting them.  Grice held such a view, and suggested that the senses 
can be distinguished by appeal to the special character of our experience which ‘resists 
both inspection and description’ (Grice 1967, p.259). 
Alternatively, we might hold on to the idea that the senses are psychological 
mechanisms and adopt kind of moderate error-theory.  Common-sense is right in 
distinguishing perceptions on the basis of how they were produced, but wrong in making 
                                                 
44 In Nudds 2003 I argue from the need to give an account of the significance of our concepts of 
different senses to a more anthropocentric account of the nature of the senses. 
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the distinctions as it does.  This suggestion takes seriously the idea that common-sense 
psychology is a kind of proto-scientific psychology, liable to revision in the light of 
empirical discoveries. 
Or we could accept that in distinguishing different perceptions we are 
distinguishing them on the basis of how they were produced, but to give up on the idea 
that we can explain or give an account of the different ways that perceptions are 
produced that is independent of our practice of making the distinction.  According to 
this approach, all visual perceptions are produced in the same way and different ways of 
perceiving are individuated relative to a social practice of explaining and understanding 
behaviour.  On this view a sense modality is what might be called a social kind rather than 
a natural kind.  Such an account may provide the best account of what a sense modality, 
as we commonly understand it, actually is.45 
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